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ABSTRACT	
The	literature	is	concentrated	in	studying	some	aspects	of	anthropogenic	climate	change	
skepticism,	in	some	regions,	but	is	sporadic	in	most	facets	and	geographies.	This	study	
attempts	to	partially	address	that	gap	by	developing	a	quantitative	model	to	discern	the	
effect	of	neoliberalism	as	a	socio-economic	system,	and	governance	as	a	harbinger	for	
psychological	attitudes,	on	climate	change	denial.	The	empirical	results,	using	a	sample	of	
21	European	countries,	reveal	that	greater	economic	freedom	has	undercut	environmental	
measures	to	address	climate	change,	and	that	effective	and	stable	governmental	practices	
have	allowed	their	respective	constituencies	the	psychological	space	to	more	fully	confront	
the	issue.	Interactive	effects	on	ideology,	however,	have	been	seen	to	be	less	conclusive.	
	
Keywords:	neoliberalism,	capitalism,	anthropogenic	climate	change,	climate	change	
scepticism,	government	stability,	psychology,	sociology.	
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1.0	Introduction	
	
1.1	Background	
	
Climate	change	is	today	seen	as	arguably	the	most	fundamental	threat	to	the	planet	as	
constituted,	and	certainly	the	primary	environmental	issue	(Norgaard,	2011).	Global	
warming	is	now	considered	indisputable,	placing	pressure	on	natural	systems	and	economic	
ones	(Stern,	2006;	IPCC,	2013).	“Climate	change	will	likely	jeopardize	state	economic	
resources,	exacerbate	social	inequality,	alter	community	structures,	and	generate	new	
patterns	of	economic	and	social	conflict”	(Norgaard,	2011:	399).	Studies	have	found	that	
between	97-98%	of	climate	change	researchers	support	the	notion	that	this	change	is	
primarily	spurred	by	anthropogenic	actions	as	per	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	
Change’s	(IPCC)	findings,	and	that	temperatures	are	to	continue	rising	in	the	absence	of	any	
retaliatory	measure	to	‘dangerous’	levels	(Anderegg	et	al.,	2010;	Poortinga	et	al.,	2010)	of	
emissions.	Furthermore,	of	those	that	remain	unconvinced	by	the	overwhelming	science,	
studies	have	concluded	that	their	relative	expertise	and	scientific	prominence	is	much	less	
esteemed	(Doran	&	Zimmerman,	2009).		
	
Given	these	facts	we	find	that,	despite	the	complexity	of	the	science	and	the	legitimate	
concerns	of	the	exact	nature	of	climate	systems,	policy	regarding	the	mitigation	and	
adaptation	of	and	to	climate	change	has	become	a	major	directive	worldover.	From	the	late	
1980’s,	when	the	issue	first	came	into	salience,	to	present	day,	climate	change	has	been	on	
the	agenda	of	the	majority	of	multi-lateral	intergovernmental	summits	and	has,	despite	
large	failures	and	seemingly	intractable	levels	of	stagnancy,	produced	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	
the	Copenhagen	Accord	and	the	Paris	Agreement,	that	latter	of	which	boasts	176	national	
signatories.	This	most	recent	show	of	unity	was	largely	driven	in	place	by	the	leadership	of	
the	European	bloc,	which	pre-empted	the	agreement	by	presenting	the	ambitious	‘2030	
Framework’,	which	called	for	40%	reductions	in	emissions	below	1990	levels	by	the	
eponymous	year.	The	multi-lateral	and	multi-level	nature	of	European	governance	has	
placed	it	in	a	unique	position	to	dictate	policy	(de	Cendra,	2010,	Jordan	et	al.,	2012),	and	is	
why	the	following	study	revolves	primarily	around	its	member	states.	
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However,	despite	this	flurry	of	activity,	and	a	rise	in	public	concern	in	general,	the	
phenomenon	of	climate	change	denial	and	scepticism	remains	rife,	with	few	signs	of	
abatement	(Norgaard,	2011).	Widespread	dissemination	of	ideas	contrary	to	the	science,	
most	notably	that	climate	change	doesn’t	exist	or,	if	it	does,	that	it	is	not	athropogenic	in	
nature,	is	prevalent.	This	is	promlematic;	ambitious	targets	require	fundamental	shifts	in	the	
way	that	energy	is	used	and	produced	and	can	only	be	met	with	sustained	and	widespread	
public	support	(Brulle,	2011).	Decarbonisation	will	not	only	require	new	technologies	and	
facilities,	but	these	new	supply	side	measures	will	drastically	affect	lifestyle	parameters.	
Individuals	and	communities	will	have	to	change	their	behaviours	in	ways	that	will	seem	
unrecognisable	to	them	now	(Steg	&	Viek,	2009),	and	which	will	act	to	upset	the	
psychological	balance	people	employ	in	their	everyday	lives	(Norgaard,	2016).	The	policy	
decisions	that	ensue	will	stem	from	this	support,	and	these	future	legislative	responses	will	
concern	themselves	with	what	is	known	as	the	‘energy	trilemma’,	which	describes	a	balance	
between	energy	security,	social	impact	and	environmental	sensitivity.	These	in	themselves	
lie	in	conflict	with	one	another	as	it	pertains	to	energy	production	(Biesboek	et	al.,	2010).		
	
This	theoretical	conflict	has	led	to	competing	actors	vying	for	the	stage	to	promote	their	
own	interests	and	mould	public	opinion	away	from	the	solidity	of	the	science,	a	scenario	
most	clearly	seen	within	the	United	States,	and	one	which	therefore	has	been	accorded	
primacy	in	previous	academic	scholarship.	Seminal	works	at	the	turn	of	the	current	decade,	
most	notably	by	McCright	&	Dunlap	(2010;	2011;	2013;	2014),	pinpointed	that	the	
phenomenon	was	largely	the	result	of	increasing	levels	of	partisanship.	“While	not	the	sole	
driver,	anthropogenic	climate	change	(ACC)	denial	activism	by	the	conservative	movement,	
Republican	politicians,	and	the	fossil	fuels	industry	has	been	effective	in	generating	within	
the	American	public	the	perception	that	scientists	do	not	agree	about	ACC,	and	this	
perception	influences	(both	directly	and	indirectly)	support	for	government	action	on	ACC.	
(2013:	199).	Uscinski	&	Olivella	(2017)	concur,	finding	that	party	elites	were	largely	to	blame	
for	the	mirage.	
	
Indeed,	as	Mann	(2014)	suggests,	climate	change	was	‘unlucky’	as	an	issue.	Before	laymen	
were	confronted	with	it	in	the	early	80’s,	legislation	such	as	the	1970	Clean	Air	Act	passed	
374-1	in	the	House	and	73-0	in	the	Senate.	However,	that	critical	decade	in	between	saw	
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environmental	attitudes	become	ideological	markers.	For	instance,	the	issue	of	acid	rain	
was	decried	by	those	on	the	left	and	both	the	Republican	administration	and	the	
Democratic	Congress	acted	to	combat	it.	Yet,	common	consensus	today	is	that	the	issue	was	
overwrought,	and	rather	than	being	relieved	that	such	problems	were	eradicable	or	at	least	
manageable,	it	began	a	process	of	recriminations	between	the	two	sides	that	has	only	since	
widened.	Environmental	concerns	became	a	proxy	by	which	wider	ideological	battles	were	
fought.	“As	symbols,	the	issues	couldn’t	be	compromised.	Standing	up	for	your	side	
telegraphed	your	commitment	to	take	back	America—either	from	tyrannical	liberal	elitism	
or	right-wing	greed	and	fecklessness”.		
	
It	is	this	right	side	which	actively	seeks	to	undermine	public	trust	in	climate	science,	an	
entity	labelled	as	a	“denial	machine”	and	comprising	of	industrial,	political	and	media	actors	
which	make	up	the	conservative	ideology	leadership	(Dunlap,	2014).	It	was	with	the	1989	
fall	of	communism	and	the	environmental	movement's	international	efforts	at	the	1992	Rio	
Earth	Summit	that	the	attention	of	U.S.	conservative	think	tanks,	which	had	been	organised	
in	the	1970’s	as	an	intellectual	counter-movement	to	socialism,	turned	from	the	"red	scare"	
to	the	"green	scare"	which	they	saw	as	a	threat	to	their	aims	of	private	property,	free	trade	
market	economies	and	global	capitalism	(Jacques	et	al.,	2008).	Thus	denialism	became	an	
arm	of	the	neoliberalism	that	was	espoused,	generated,	and	proliferated	in	the	era	of	
Thatcher	and	Reagan	as	a	response	to	the	crises	of	the	1970s’	Great	Society	regime,	and	
which	was	consolidated	as	hegemony	during	the	Clinton	presidency	(Brulle,	2011).	This	
scepticism	fed	off	the	already	prevailing	polarization	within	the	major	issues	that	dominated	
the	American	landscape:	financial	ruptures,	economic	inequality,	unemployment,	and	so	
forth.	Brulle	(2011:	200)	recognized	that	it	was	going	to	be	difficult	“to	mobilize	people	for	
climate	change	mitigation	unless	it	(was)	done	in	concert	with	efforts	to	engage	these	other	
pressing	problems,	which	also	have	been	generated	or	at	least	exacerbated	by	neoliberal	
globalization”.	It	suggested,	therefore,	that	the	stability	of	a	socio-economic	system,	as	
mediated	by	the	government,	would	therefore	be	paramount	in	laying	the	foundation	for	a	
sort	of	buffer	which	would	allow	drastic	action	on	climate	change	to	take	place.	
	
1.2	Direction	of	Research	
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While	the	United	States	has	been	analysed	extensively	due	to	its	leading	role	in	the	
politicisation	of	climate	change	science,	a	question	arises	as	to	whether	the	polarisation	
regarding	climate	change	denial	in	ideology	that	is	found	in	the	U.S.	is	also	manifestly	
observable	in	Europe,	albeit	at	a	less	pronounced	scale.	Research	suggests	that	in	
comparison	to	the	developing	world	scepticism	has	increased	in	Western	countries	in	the	
last	decade	after	a	momentary	downturn,	largely	on	account	of	the	financial	crisis	of	2008	
(Eurobarometer,	2009;	Leiserowitz	et	al.,	2010,	Capstick,	2015).	Indeed,	a	more	nuanced	
look	at	ideology’s	effect	on	scepticism	will	perhaps	offer	more	precise	methods	by	which	we	
one	might	look	to	further	engage	the	public	with	the	concerns	of	ACC.	In	general,	Europe	
has	seen	less	analysis	in	the	climate	change	denial	realm	simply	because	the	studies	have	
consistently	shown	less	disparity	between	different	groups	within	the	bloc	and	their	beliefs	
on	the	matter	(see	Figure	1,	below).	This	study	not	only	seeks	to	ascertain	the	link	between	
neoliberalism	as	a	governmental	objective	and	climate	change	scepticism,	but	also	to	ask	
whether	countries	with	more	stringently	employed	neoliberal	practices	have	diffused	their	
inherent	anti-environmental	stance	onto	its	constituency	ideologically,	on	an	individual	
level.	Does	the	constituency	do	little	save	follow	the	lead	of	its	state	elite,	or	is	it	such	that	
the	populace	is	guilty	of	the	same	bias	that	their	governments	have	installed	to	create	the	
current	paradigm?	Ignorance	or	wilful	ignorance?	It	seeks	to	offer	a	snapshot	of	the	state	of	
Europe	given	its	various	socio-political	positions	and,	given	this	paper	is	not	a	temporal	
study	on	account	of	this	being	based	on	the	first	survey	of	its	kind,	it	positions	itself	to	allow	
further	studies	aimed	at	understanding	whether	a	given	populace	become	further	
indoctrinated	over	time	as	the	short	term	benefits	of	neoliberalism	solidify.	
	
This	paper	will	discuss	the	implications	of	ideology,	neoliberalism,	governmental	stability	
and	the	core	tenets	of	human	psychology	on	the	phenomenon	of	climate	change	denial.	A	
theoretical	framework	will	be	drawn	to	encapsulate	the	above	issues,	in	which	five	
hypotheses	will	be	presented.	Our	variables,	alongside	the	data	to	measure	them,	will	then	
be	introduced	and	a	quantitative	methodology	discussed,	before	the	results	of	both	a	multi-
level	regression	and	a	qualitative	analysis	will	be	presented	in	order	to	sythesise	fully	with	
the	theoretical	framework.	Finally	we	will	discuss	the	results,	limitations	of	the	method	and	
avenues	for	further	research.	
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2.0	Theoretical	Framework	
	
2.1	Synopsis	
	
Extrapolating	further	from	the	findings	of	McCright	&	Dunlap	(2013),	or	of	Poortinga	et	al.	
(2010),	individual	rather	than	aggregate	level	observances	yielded	that	“climate	scepticism	
appeared	particularly	common	among	older	individuals	from	lower	socio-economic	
backgrounds	who	are	politically	conservative	and	hold	traditional	values;	while	less	common	
among	younger	individuals	from	higher	socioeconomic	backgrounds	who	hold	self-
transcendence	and	environmental	values.	The	finding	that	climate	scepticism	is	rooted	in	
people’s	core	values	and	worldviews	may	imply	coherent	and	encompassing	sceptical	
outlook	on	climate	change”.	There	is	a	clear	cross-section	here	between	ideology	and	the	
economic	system	that	has	come	to	prevalence	through	that	ideology:	neoliberalism.	The	
effects	of	each	on	anthropogenic	climate	change	scepticism	are	intertwined.	Indeed,	at	this	
juncture,	we	must	define	the	meaning	of	anthropogenic	climate	change	(ACC).	Lenton	et	al.	
(2008),	a	differentiation	is	made	between	two	forms.	The	first	meaning	is	future	oriented,	
summarised	by	the	notion	that	anthropogenic	emissions	will	lead	to	global	warming,	while	
the	second	is	past	oriented,	suggesting	that	human	activities	have	conspicuously	changed	
the	global	climate.	Both	statements	are	heavily	supported	by	the	evidence,	though	the	first	
is	not	conditional	on	the	second.	In	this	paper	we	shall	lean	most	heavily	on	the	second	
definition,	so	as	to	correspond	with	the	question	asked	in	Figure	1,	below.	
	
Figure	1:	Survey	response	to:	“Temperature	rise	is	part	of	global	warming	or	climate	change.	
Do	you	think	rising	temperatures	are	rising	as	a	result	of	human	activities?”	Source:	Pelham,	
B.	(2009).	Awareness,	Opinions	About	Global	Warming	Vary	Worldwide.	Gallup.	
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In	the	Rahmstorf	typology	of	2004,	a	further	categorisation	is	made	to	classify	the	brand	of	
scepticism	in	the	individuals	themselves.	There	are	three:	trend	sceptics,	who	deny	change,	
attribution	sceptics,	who	deny	blame	on	the	part	of	humans,	and	impact	sceptics,	who	deny	
the	change	will	be	disastrous.	Though	Rahmstorf	makes	certain	that	there	is	a	high	level	of	
correlation	between	the	three,	given	the	paragraph	prior	we	can	clearly	assign	attribution	
scepticism	to	this	study.	Yet	we	should	remain	wary	as	to	the	source	of	this	sort	of	
scepticism;	as	Klein	(2014)	makes	clear,	oftentimes	the	right-wing	elite	understand	the	
science	better	than	the	left,	and	certainly	those	in	the	centre,	in	order	to	argue	against	it	
and	further	their	agenda.	On	an	individual	level,	however,	we	will	finally	also	seek	to	
ascertain	the	psychological	configurations	inherent	in	humanity	that	magnify	the	ideology	
that	exists	apart	of	and	inherent	in	the	said	psychology.	Poortinga	et	al.	(2011)	confirms	that	
climate	scepticism	is	founded	upon	people’s	core	values	and	worldviews,	yet	too	often	we	
resort	to	ascribing	ideology	upon	this	definition,	without	understanding	that	the	humanity	
comes	before	the	ideology.	As	Norgaard	(2011:	400)	suggests,	“people	actually	work	to	
avoid	acknowledging	disturbing	information	in	order	to	avoid	emotions	of	fear,	guilt,	and	
helplessness,	follow	cultural	norms,	and	maintain	positive	conceptions	of	individual	and	
national	identity”.	This	lies	before	the	approach	of	political	polarisation,	and	as	such	will	also	
figure	into	our	understanding	of	how	climate	change	scepticism	manifests	itself.		
	
	
	 Cooke,	B.M.	⏐	Examining	the	gears	of	climate	change	scepticism	(2018)	 	 10	
2.2	Ideology	and	Neoliberalism;	
	
In	Parr’s	2013	discourse,	‘The	Wrath	of	Capital:	Neoliberalism	and	Climate	Change	Politics”,	
the	author	damningly	declares	that	“although	climate	change	has	become	the	dominant	
concern	of	the	twenty-first	century,	global	powers	refuse	to	implement	the	changes	
necessary	to	reverse	these	trends.	Instead,	they	have	neoliberalised	(sic)	nature	and	climate	
change	politics	and	discourse,	and	there	are	indications	of	a	more	virulent	strain	of	capital	
accumulation	on	the	horizon”.	This	was	laid	on	the	back	of	the	century	before,	where	two	
policy	regimes	competed	in	the	hegemonic	western	world	(Brulle,	2011).	On	the	one	hand	
lay	market	liberalism,	stressing	unfettered	capitalism,	strong	property	rights,	and	a	minimal	
social	safety	net,	while	on	the	other,	social	liberalism,	favouring	modest	state	intervention,	
redistribution,	and	welfare	provision.	Particularly	in	the	case	of	the	United	States,	capitalist	
ownership	or	management	was	only	cosmetically	challenged,	and	as	such	“anti-
environmentalism	has	been,	from	the	start,	a	keystone	of	neoliberal	anti-regulatory	politics”	
(2013:	197).		
	
Klein	(2014)	has	described	the	state	of	affairs	as	having	evolved	into	a	scenario	whereby	
capitalist	globalization	and	climate	change	science	lie	at	opposite	poles,	unable	to	gain	sight	
of	one	another	and	oblivious	to	the	interdependency	between	environment	and	economy.	
Emboldened	by	both	victory	in	the	Cold	War	and	the	barren	landscape	cleared	by	the	
policies	of	Reagan	and	Thatcher	the	decade	prior,	neoliberalism	has	now	taken	pole	position	
and	is	handily	winning	the	war	between	the	two	(McCright	&	Dunlap,	2011).	This	is	to	say	
that	by	its	nature,	“neoliberal	capitalism	categorically	rejects	the	policy	instruments,	
governance	structures	and	cultural	values	which	are	essential	to	tackle	the	problem”	(Klein,	
2014:	136).	As	such,	the	end	portended	is	ominous;	either	we	stay	the	course	and	allow	the	
shifting	dynamics	of	the	climate	to	completely	reconfigure	our	world,	or	we	upend	our	
economic	system	in	its	entirety	to	avoid	the	fate.	In	itself,	this	raises	some	interesting	
questions	that	will	be	addressed	more	fully	in	the	section	2.2.	In	the	interim	though,	we	can	
surmise	a	reasonable	assumption	that	in	order	for	the	levers	to	turn	towards	our	current	
paradigm,	as	a	species	we	must	have	become	ensconced,	unwittingly	or	not,	in	
neoliberalism	and	consequently	by	the	implications	it	holds.	
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Klein	continues	by	suggesting	that	further	to	the	contradiction	in	economic	terms,	the	
reason	why	we	fail	to	fully	contend	with	climate	change	and	its	impacts	are	because	of	the	
foundations	upon	which	the	Western	world	stands,	an	explanation	which	has	as	an	adjunct	
the	system	of	neoliberalism.	The	overriding	sense	that	we	can	outsmart	nature,	coupled	
with	the	consumerist	society	we	have	become	enamoured	with,	alongside	the	notion	that	in	
order	to	confront	it,	we	would	need	to	signal	the	death	of	the	most	powerful	industry	the	
world	has	ever	known	in	oil	and	gas,	culminates	in	the	notion	that	we	“are	locked	in—
politically,	physically,	and	culturally”	(2014:	63).	Even	supranationally,	patriotism	pits	one	
country	against	another	rather	than	creating	an	environment	where	cooperation	is	key.	Rich	
countries	dig	in	their	heels	and	declare	that	they	won’t	cut	emissions	and	risk	losing	their	
vaulted	position	in	the	global	hierarchy;	poorer	countries	declare	that	they	won’t	give	up	
their	right	to	pollute	as	much	as	rich	countries	did	on	their	way	to	wealth,	even	if	that	
means	deepening	a	disaster	that	hurts	the	poor	most	of	all	(Parr,	2013).	This	dovetails	
perfectly	with	the	conservative	mindset	which	allows	inequality	to	run	rampant.		
	
In	all	manner	of	things,	it	becomes	apparent	that	neoliberalism	is	the	barrier	by	which	
climate	change	adaptation	cannot	pass.	And	it	is	no	wonder.	Pundits	as	esteemed	as	the	
former	chairman	of	the	IPCC,	Rajendra	Pachuari,	have	argued	(Schipper,	2007)	that	climate	
change	is	reversible	by	utilising	green	technologies	and	making	obsolete	dirty	industries,	
giving	rise	to	new	wealth	production.	In	effect,	they	seek	to	defeat	the	forces	of	free	market	
capitalism	by	using	them	in	the	solution,	not	comprehending	the	notion	that	climate	change	
and	environmental	dilapidation	are,	at	their	nexus,	issues	of	equality	(Parr,	2013).	Creating	
technologies	that	will	be	owned	and	patented	only	serves	to	bolster	the	system	which	led	us	
to	the	impasse	we	find	ourselves	in	presently.	The	green	free	market	favours	the	current	
system	of	privatisation	at	the	expense	of	exploring	new	economic	alternatives;	for	this	
reason,	it	is	mere	cronyism.	Neoliberalism	has	bastardised	the	fundamentals	of	liberalism	to	
which	such	an	effort	might	be	directed.	“In	the	name	of	celebrating	individual	responsibility	
and	choice,	neoliberal	policies	have	resulted	in	cutbacks	on	government	spending,	mass	
privatization,	trickle-down	economics,	deregulation,	open	competition,	and	the	gradual	
deterioration	of	the	commons”	(Bailey,	2007).		As	eloquently	summarised	by	Amory	Lovins	
(2008),	“markets	make	very	good	servants,	but	they’re	not	good	masters,	and	they’re	a	
lousy	religion”.		
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At	this	juncture	we	can	formulate	our	first	hypothesis;	
	
H1(a):	In	more	neoliberal	societies	we	observe	increasing	levels	of	climate	change	scepticism	
among	individuals.		
	
This	brings	us	to	a	more	nuanced	study	of	the	effects	of	ideology	at	the	individual	level,	as	it	
relates	to	neoliberalism.	As	we	have	seen	prior,	the	tenets	of	neoliberalism	have	been	
observed	to	be	in	direct	conflict	with	the	facts	established	in	climate	change	science.	
Neoliberals	attack	the	idea	of	public	goods	and	oppose	regulation,	taxation,	and	other	state	
policies	which	do	not	serve	the	short-term	corporate	bottom	line	and	investor	
accumulations	(Brulle,	2011).	This	is	synonymous	with	the	conservative	right,	whom	studies	
have	found	to	equate	democracy	with	“economic	freedom”	or	“free	enterprise”—property	
rights,	contracts,	and	consumer	choice	(Rossen,	2015:	43).	The	result	is	that,	in	the	United	
States,	75%	of	Democrats	believe	that	climate	change	is	anthropogenic,	while	among	
Republicans	that	number	plummets	to	20%.	It	manifests	itself	in	the	real	world	rather	
blatantly.	Even	the	EU’s	Emissions	Trading	Scheme,	a	policy	seen	as	the	bastion	of	climate	
change	mitigation,	has	seen	business	leaders	looking	to	turn	a	profit	by	taking	advantage	of	
this	neoliberal	framework	(Bailey,	2007).		
	
Their	moral	imperatives	(detailed	in	2.2)	again	stipulate	that	no	harm	should	come	to	this	
state	of	affairs;	neoliberalism	ensures	the	further	segregation	of	wealth	in	a	way	which	will	
benefit	them,	financially	at	least.	“The	core	of	the	problem	comes	back	to	the	same	
inescapable	fact	that	has	both	blocked	climate	action	and	accelerated	emissions:	all	of	us	
are	living	in	the	world	that	neoliberalism	built,	even	if	we	happen	to	be	critics	of	
neoliberalism”	(Klein,	2014:	138).	Seen	in	this	light,	climate	change	scepticism	is	derived	
from	the	perception	that	the	legislative	policies	designed	to	mitigate	climate	change	have	
regulatory	implications,	counter	to	the	tenets	of	a	free	market	ideology	in	which	unfettered	
markets	are	seen	to	provide	the	best	social	and	economic	outcomes	for	society.	Oreskes	&	
Conway	(2010)	corroborate	this,	detailing	how	climate	change	denial	has	been	deliberately	
orchestrated	by	a	small	but	vocal	group	of	laissez-faire,	free	marketeers.	Furthermore,	
empirical	evidence	(Lewandowsky	et	al.,	2013)	shows	that	a	neoliberal	ideology	strongly	
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correlates	to	a	rejection	of	reality	as	it	pertains	to	climate	change,	accounting	for	up	to	80%	
of	the	variance	in	climate	change	denial.	Again	we	see	that	conservatives,	the	defenders	of	
neoliberalism,	continue	to	wholeheartedly	deny	the	facts	offered	up	by	the	science	because	
climate	change	“detonates	the	ideological	scaffolding	on	which	contemporary	conservatism	
rests”	(Klein,	2014).	As	such	we	find	ourselves	with	the	second	hypothesis:	
	
H1(b):	Conservative	ideology	is	a	clear	indicator	towards	climate	change	scepticism.	
	
They	are	simultaneously	offered	ample	support	by	the	neoconservative	base	as	well	as	the	
evangelical	Christian	bloc,	who	traditionally	support	an	aggressive	foreign	policy	and	a	
cultural	conservatism.	Preservation	of	the	status	quo	is	the	key.	These	faults	of	the	current	
paradigm	we	find	ourselves	in	lie	also	at	the	feet	of	the	sustainability	movement,	who	seem	
unable	to	grasp	that	the	economic	and	cultural	implications	of	their	proposed	remedies	will	
be	too	severe	to	swallow	(Parr,	2013).	As	such	it	permits	the	economic	hegemony	to	define	
and	dictate	the	trajectory	of	the	climate	change	conversation.	To	her,	neoliberalism	is	
defined,	aptly,	as	an	“exclusive	system	premised	upon	the	logic	of	property	rights	and	the	
expansion	of	these	rights,	all	the	while	maintaining	that	the	free	market	is	self-regulating,	
sufficiently	and	efficiently	working	to	establish	individual	and	collective	well-being"	(2013:	
5).	The	left	must	therefore	come	up	with	a	counterpoint	which	is	equally	if	not	more	self-
regulating;	sustainability	has	to	be	sustainable.	Gunster’s	(2016;	136)	determination	that	
change	must	come	from	a	groundswell	of	“diverse	and	rapidly	emerging	set	of	place-based	
social	movements	fighting	for	social	justice,	self-determination,	equality	and	democracy”	
rather	than	the	elites	is	true,	but	overly	simplistic.	Until	a	viable	ecosystem	sprouts	from	the	
ideology	left	of	centre,	neoliberals	will	keep	on	singing	the	same	song,	aware	of	its	efficacy	
thus	far.	Indeed,	having	now	been	spurred	into	action	by	the	perceived	threats	posed	by	
climate	change	discourse,	the	conservative	machine	has	gone	into	overdrive	in	order	to	
achieve	a	bias	manifest	in	the	proletariat	and	so	extend	their	winnings	(Klein,	2014).	
	
The	media	was	central	to	this	operationalizing	movement.		Hmielowski	(2013)	notes	that	
conservative	media	use	corresponded	to	a	decreasing	trust	in	climate	change	science,	while	
non-conservative	media	intake	showed	the	opposite	effect.	This	media	was	deployed	by	91	
‘climate	change	counter-movements’	(CCCM’s)	observed	between	the	years	of	2003	and	
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2010	(Brulle,	2013)	which	had	an	average	of	USD$964	million	in	combined	budget	in	order	
to	disseminate	what	was	effectively	false	and	misleading	information,	money	which	was	
donated	overwhelmingly	by	conservative	foundations.	One	such	indicative	example	as	per	
Klein	(2014),	who	undertook	a	sweep	of	conservative	positions	in	media	outlets,	was	of	
conservative	columnist	and	climate	change	denier	George	Will,	who	“argued	that	the	
fanatical	‘green	left’s’	charges	that	CO2	emissions	and	fossil	fuel	industries	pose	a	‘planetary	
menace’	provide	a	rationale	for	the	government	to	‘intrude’	everywhere,	curtail	consumer	
choice	and	property	rights,	and	increase	the	state’s	size	and	surveillance”.	The	effect	was	
twofold.	After	the	ensuing	blowback	from	the	liberal	left,	the	conservative	media	counter-
attacked	by	complaining	about	unfair	bias	in	the	mainstream	media.	Seeking	correction,	or	
editorial	balance,	the	mainstream	media	endeavoured	to	grant	parity	to	the	positions	of	the	
CCCM’s	(Boykoff,	2008).	The	public,	ensconced	in	the	insecurities	of	a	ceaseless	war	and	
financial	hardship,	proved	receptive	to	the	fear	mongering	concerning	overall	liberty.		
	
It	becomes	apparent,	in	this	light,	that	denial	is	not	necessarily	indicative	of	a	lower	state	of	
knowledge,	but	rather	as	a	consequence	of	“an	acute	perception	of	the	profound	economic	
and	political	consequences	of	climate	change”	(Gunster,	2016).	Increased	scepticism	has	
been	found	in	the	past	to	be	primarily	associated	with	socio-economic	factors	outside	of	
education;	higher	age	&	wealth,	privileged	location	&	lifestyle,	a	male	designation,	and	most	
predominately,	conservative	political	and	environmental	views	(Whitmarsh,	2010;	Klein,	
2014;	McCright	&	Dunlap,	2011,	Braman	et	al.,	2012).	The	modern	life	has	been	both	
created	and	insulated	by	industrial	capitalism,	and	the	conservative	defenders	of	this	
neoliberalism	intervene	to	ensure	the	people	keep	the	faith	by	taking	the	only	avenue	
available	to	them:	“by	claiming	that	thousands	upon	thousands	of	scientists	are	lying	and	
that	climate	change	is	an	elaborate	hoax…	They	deny	reality,	in	other	words,	because	the	
implications	of	that	reality	are,	quite	simply,	unthinkable”	(Klein,	2014:	38).	Indeed,	if	we	
take	a	look	at	climate	change	intervention	as	a	microcosm	of	the	ideology	of	the	left	we	see	
the	truth	of	Klein’s	retelling	of	a	2008	quote	made	by	a	rather	lucid	president	of	a	
conservative	think	tank,	Joseph	Bast:	“Climate	change	is	the	perfect	thing.…	It’s	the	reason	
why	we	should	do	everything	[the	left]	wanted	to	do	anyway.”	Ideology,	specifically	that	of	
the	right,	has	swung	neoliberalism	to	work	in	its	favour,	and	the	maintenance	of	the	socio-
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economic	system	is	paramount	to	ensuring	the	ledger	remains	heavier	on	that	right	hand	
side.		
	
While	this	has	been	shown	in	America	in	particular,	no	studies	have	established	the	trend	
within	Europe;	this	highlights	the	second,	linked	hypothesis;	
	
H1(c):	Neoliberalism	accentuates	the	effect	of	right	leaning	ideology	in	predicting	climate	
change	scepticism	in	Europe.	
	
Looking	at	this	from	an	even	wider	macro	perspective,	the	stakes	become	menacing.	There	
is	a	heavily	imbued	sense	of	fear,	and	potential	guilt,	that	the	free	market	system	has	
triggered	a	series	of	outcomes	that	without	regulation	would	indeed	threaten	huge	swathes	
of	humanity	(Parr,	2013,	Klein,	2014).	If	this	were	to	be	proved	correct,	then	the	moral	
pretence	with	which	they	fought	so	hard	for	capitalism	comes	up	hollow.	So	the	thinking	
goes,	as	soon	as	they	admit	that	climate	change	is	real,	they	will	lose	the	central	ideological	
battle	of	our	time.	Yet	in	the	interests	of	intellectual	honesty,	we	should	note	that	leftists	
are	not	impervious	to	this	most	human	of	traits	either.	Confirmation	bias	is	a	human	
affliction,	and	so	“if	conservatives	are	inherent	system	justifiers,	and	therefore	bridle	before	
facts	that	call	the	dominant	economic	system	into	question,	then	most	leftists	are	inherent	
system	questioners,	and	therefore	prone	to	scepticism	about	facts	that	come	from	
corporations	and	government”	(Klein,	2014:	32).	This	understanding	will	be	factored	into	
the	conclusions	drawn	at	the	end	of	this	paper.	In	any	case,	as	it	pertains	to	the	politics	of	
climate	change,	we	can	see	that	far	from	a	simple	disagreement	with	the	facts	as	espoused	
by	the	scientific	community,	anthropogenic	climate	change	scepticism	remains	the	province	
of	ideology	and	the	socio-economic	drivers	behind	it	more	than	any	other	single	factor.	
	
2.3	Psychology	in	and	of	Stability;	
	
As	previously	stated,	past	research	has	often	centred	on	demographics,	lifestyle,	knowledge,	
values	and	ideology,	with	a	particular	emphasis	on	the	latter.	(Whitmarsh,	2010;	Klein,	
2014;	McCright	&	Dunlap,	2011,	Braman	et	al.,	2012).	Yet	according	to	Norgaard	(2006)	and	
Gifford	(2011),	this	analysis	seems	to	miss	the	inherent,	base	level	instincts	that	drive	
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humanity.	While	all	scepticism	is	of	course	psychological,	a	distinction	has	to	be	made	been	
endogenous	and	exogenous	drivers.	Here,	in	contrast	to	the	section	prior,	we	look	at	the	
former,	and	how	they	relate	to	the	construct	that	is	built	around	them	by	external	forces.	
For	if	we	simply	look	at	ideology	as	the	foundation	stone	of	any	analysis	of	climate	change	
scepticism,	we	might	be	tempted	into	assuming	the	unsupported	claim	that	people	have	
stopped	caring	about	the	environment,	the	poor,	or	future	generations.	If	we	did	not	dig	
deeper,	it	would	seem	irrational	to	suggest	otherwise	in	explaining	our	collective	passivity	
(Norgaard,	2011).		
	
Norgaard	undertakes	an	ethnographic	approach	in	order	to	root	out	the	base	cause;	she	
conducted	46	interviews	and	attempted	to	categorise	the	‘strategies	of	denial’	which,	
broadly	speaking,	were	either	interpretive	or	cultural.	All	interviewees	were	within	one	
community	in	the	rural	west	of	Norway,	and	while	this	clearly	makes	the	subject	of	external	
validity	problematic,	it	did	reveal	a	trend	towards	cognitive	dissonance	predicted	by	several	
studies	prior	(Stoll-Kleeman	et	al.,	2001;	Lorenzoni	et	al.,	2007);	Norgaard	recorded	both	
awareness	and	concern	over	the	issue	in	her	sample,	but	also	the	sense	that	it	was	an	issue	
that	tended	to	stick	in	the	throat.	It	was	synonymous	with	what	the	British	sociologist	
Stanley	Cohen	referred	to	as	‘implicatory	denial’,	whereby	knowledge	about	a	war	in	a	
region	far	flung	from	your	own,	and	the	women	raped	and	children	starved	therein,	are	
given	short	shrift	because	they	are	“not	seen	as	psychologically	disturbing	or	as	carrying	
amoral	imperative	to	act…	Unlike	literal	or	interpretive	denial,	knowledge	itself	is	not	at	
issue,	but	doing	the	‘right’	thing	with	the	knowledge”	(Cohen,	2001:	9).	Humanity	requires	
these	delineations	because	without	them,	stability	in	the	human	mind	would	be	
compromised.	
	
Applying	this	to	the	aforementioned	climate	sceptic	campaigns,	we	can	see	that	they	have	
an	inherent	handicap	advantage	over	those	that	would	promote	action:	“people	actually	
work	to	avoid	acknowledging	disturbing	information	in	order	to	avoid	emotions	of	fear,	
guilt,	and	helplessness,	follow	cultural	norms,	and	maintain	positive	conceptions	of	
individual	and	national	identity.	As	a	result	of	this	kind	of	denial,	people	describe	a	sense	of	
‘knowing	and	not	knowing’	about	climate	change,	of	having	information	but	not	thinking	
about	it	in	their	everyday	lives”	(Norgaard,	2011:	404).	Poortinga	et.	al.	(2010:	20)	refers	to	
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a	“finite	pool	of	worry”.	This	apparent	cowardice,	or	wilful	ignorance,	though,	reminds	us	
that	to	disregard	an	issue	of	such	monstrous	import	could	be	as	difficult	as	attempting	to	
solve	it;	to	curtail	feelings	of	empathy	as	to	extend	them,	or	to	temper	one’s	emotions	by	
exerting	control	one’s	thoughts	(Rosenberg,	1991;	Hochschild,	1983).	Our	paralysis	in	that	
case	is	not	a	reflection	of	our	greed	or	inhumanity,	but	rather	because	the	issue	is	morbid,	
which	is	in	fact	an	echo	of	our	charity.	In	any	case,	it	becomes	clear	that	just	because	
individuals	indicate	that	they	do	not	personally	worry	about	the	impacts	of	climate	change	it	
does	not	necessarily	mean	they	think	that	there	is	nothing	to	worry	about	(Carolan,	2010).	
	
In	Norway’s	case,	Norgaard	(2011)	identified	certain	cultural	norms	which	rendered	it	
improper	to	express	emotions	that	they	held	privately,	despite	other	cultural	norms	of	
egalitarianism	and	environmental	consciousness.	This	produced	the	net	negative	effect	of	
sweeping	everything	under	the	proverbial	rug.	Looking	even	more	intently	at	the	situation,	
one	must	ask	why	such	cultural	norms	existed;	the	author	contends	that	socially	organised	
denial	in	a	country	of	Norway’s	affluence	holds	a	relationship	with	studies	of	privilege.	This	
is	where	the	psychology	intercepts	with	the	concepts	of	neoliberalism	mentioned	earlier.	
“Ongoing	changes	in	social	organization,	especially	the	twin	forces	of	globalization	and	
increasing	inequality	creates	a	situation	in	which,	for	privileged	people,	environmental	and	
social	justice	problems	are	increasingly	distant	in	time	or	space	or	both.	Social	inequality	
helps	to	perpetuate	environmental	degradation	making	it	easier	to	displace	visible	
outcomes	and	costs	across	borders	of	time	and	space,	out	of	the	way	of	those	citizens	with	
the	potential	time,	energy,	cultural	capital,	and	political	clout	to	generate	moral	outrage	and	
take	action	in	a	variety	of	ways”	(2011;	410).	Nations	significantly	less	fortunate	than	
Norway	will	be	impacted	by	climate	change	much	sooner,	and	as	such	a	contradiction-in-
terms	ensues	whereby,	on	a	relative	scale,	the	issue	becomes	less	of	a	concern	to	those	who	
have	the	means	to	reckon	with	it.	And	as	global	capitalism	ensures	that,	within	the	
economic	paradigm	we	currently	occupy,	wealth	segregation	will	continue	to	grow,	not	only	
will	the	issue	remain	unresolved,	it	will	get	significantly	direr	in	light	of	affluent	countries	
moving	to	barricade	themselves	from	the	insecurity	that	pervades	in	the	developing	world.	
Stability	can	propel	you	into	problem	solving,	but	it	can	also	insulate	you	from	future	harm.	
	
In	review:	Given	the	exhibited,	explicit	desire	of	humanity	for	comfort,	to	ease	insecurity	or	
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uncertainty,	it	would	therefore	follow	that	nations	which	allowed	their	constituents	a	
margin	of	error	in	lieu	of	a	smoothly	running,	stable	governmental	machine	would	also	
allow	them	the	space	to	contemplate	climate	change	in	all	its	implications	without	the	same	
commensurate	level	of	fear	as	in	other	nations	where	the	burden	of	survival	is	already	high.	
That	is	to	say,	beneficial	cultural	habits	can	be	formed	through	strong,	positive	leadership	
with	long	term	targets	which	aid	in	the	climate	change	issue.	Of	course,	it	is	prudent	to	
recognise	that	stability	might	generate	competing	interests.	The	paradigm	outlined	above	
could	be	turned	on	its	head;	namely,	if	a	government	is	more	stable,	it	has	more	of	a	buffer	
zone	to	itself	change	the	status	quo.	Yet	one	could	also	conclude	that	the	populace	
underneath	them,	assuming	the	consideration	of	an	affluent	Western	nation,	will	generally	
be	less	inclined	to	upset	their	own	privileged	balance.	A	paradox	ensues.	We	must	turn	
therefore	to	an	interaction	between	ideology	and	government	stability,	which	produces	the	
final	two	hypotheses:		
	
H2(a):	In	societies	with	strong,	stable	and	effective	governance	we	observe	decreasing	levels	
of	climate	change	scepticism	among	individuals.	
	
H2(b):	Stable	and	effective	governance	offers	a	socio-economic	buffer	which	accentuates	the	
ideology	of	its	constituency	in	predicting	the	level	of	climate	change	scepticism.	
	
This	bears	hallmarks	with	the	system	justification	and	social	dominance	orientation	(SDO)	
theories	as	espoused	by	scholars	such	as	Jost	&	Hunyady	(2005)	and	Feygina	et	al.	(2009)	in	
the	case	of	the	former,	and	Jylha	&	Akrami	(2015)	in	the	case	of	the	latter.	According	to	
system	justification	theory,	our	appraisals	of	our	social	and	institutional	are	balanced	by	
epistemic	needs	to	maintain	a	sense	of	certainty	and	stability,	existential	needs	to	feel	
secure	and	supported,	and	interpersonal	needs	to	interact	with	those	in	the	same	broad	
position	(Ledgerwood	&	Hardin,	2008).	Combined,	these	needs	motivate	the	individual	to	
perceive	the	system	as	fair,	legitimate,	beneficial,	and	stable,	as	well	as	the	desire	to	
maintain	and	protect	the	status	quo	(Jost,	Liviatan,	et	al.,	2009).	In	the	short	term	this	can	
be	desirable,	as	it	can	assuage	anxiety,	uncertainty	and	fear,	but	the	long-term	implications	
of	pursuing	the	system	justification	goal	can	be	negative,	where	it	interferes	with	forming	
intentions	or	taking	action	to	correct	injustices	or	system-level	problems	(Wakslak	et	al.,	
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2007).	Consistent	with	self-interest,	those	who	are	advantaged	by	the	system	typically	
engage	in	system	justification	more	enthusiastically	than	those	who	are	disadvantaged,	and	
as	such,	in	line	with	the	previous	paragraph,	it	indicates	a	major	obstacle	in	accomplishing	
positive	environmental	change.	This	is	to	say,	the	more	people	are	motivated	to	defend	and	
bolster	the	existing	system,	the	more	likely	they	will	be	to	deny	environmental	problems,	
insofar	as	these	challenge	the	system’s	legitimacy	as	well	as	its	stability	(Feygina	et	al.,	
2009).		
	
SDO,	in	contrast,	is	conceptualized	as	a	measure	of	an	individual's	preference	for	
hierarchy	within	any	social	system	and	the	domination	over	lower-status	groups.	In	a	study	
of	Kahan	et	al.	(2012),	it	was	found	that	“people	with	strong	‘egalitarian’	and	
‘communitarian’	worldviews	(marked	by	an	inclination	toward	collective	action	and	social	
justice,	concern	about	inequality,	and	suspicion	of	corporate	power)	overwhelmingly	accept	
the	scientific	consensus	on	climate	change.	Conversely,	those	with	strong	“hierarchical”	and	
“individualistic”	worldviews	(marked	by	opposition	to	government	assistance	for	the	poor	
and	minorities,	strong	support	for	industry,	and	a	belief	that	we	all	pretty	much	get	what	we	
deserve)	overwhelmingly	reject	the	scientific	consensus”.	In	essence,	it	reinforces	what	we	
have	determined	previously,	in	that	people	find	it	cognitively	distressing	to	realise	that	what	
they	consider	as	noble	is	damaging,	and	that	what	they	consider	as	base	was	virtuous.	
Under	this	pretext,	climate	change	mitigation	efforts	could	be	more	successful	if	framed	as	
being	clearly	beneficial	for	everybody	and	non-threatening	to	the	existing	social	order.	
	
As	a	final	appeal	to	psychology,	I	turn	now	to	that	most	opaque	of	fields,	morality.	In	moral	
foundation	theory	the	exact	nature	of	a	utopic	society	is	politically	debated	in	light	of	five	
core	moral	domains	(Haidt	&	Graham,	2007).	In	these	matter,	there	is	a	digression	between	
adherents	to	the	left,	whom	identify	the	“individualising	foundations”	–	harm	and	fairness	–	
and	those	who	adhere	to	right,	who	support	a	further	three	base	measures	which	are	
important	in	community	building	–	in-group	loyalty	(e.g.	patriotism),	authority	(i.e.	hierarchy	
and	obedience),	and	purity	(i.e.	transcendence	of	base	nature).	As	Klein	(2014:	44)	
continues,	“It	has	recently	been	proposed	that	the	differences	in	moral	considerations	may	
be	at	the	heart	of	the	observed	political	divisions	about	climate	change.	The	effects	of	
climate	change	quite	naturally	speak	to	the	moral	concerns	of	harm	avoidance	and	fairness	
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(e.g.	climate	change	will	harm	the	most	vulnerable	in	the	world	first),	but	not	necessarily	to	
morality	focussed	on	in-group	loyalty,	deference	to	authority	and	personal	restraint”.	At	this	
juncture,	the	prospect	of	a	sixth	foundation	comes	into	play,	which	brings	us	full	circle.	This	
is	the	concept	of	the	right	to	economic	liberty,	unrestrained	from	the	egalitarian	impositions	
that	the	contemporary	liberals	would	burden	conservatives	with	under	different	guises	of	
‘fairness’.	From	this	perspective,	government	intervention	and	wealth	redistribution	are	
potential	moral	violations,	seen	as	unjust	because	they	presume	that	people	have	a	moral	
obligation	to	the	welfare	of	others	(Iyer	et	al.,	2012).	And	although	this	would	make	a	case	
for	neoliberalism,	which	we	evaluate	as	undermining	equality	–	insofar	as	climate	change	is	
about	equality,	as	suggested	earlier	–	this	rumination	bears	out	the	immediate	hypothesis	
above,	in	the	rather	obvious	conclusion	that	it	is	imperative	for	a	degree	of	ideological	
consensus	in	order	for	any	stability	in	governance	to	be	reached.	
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3.0	Data	&	Methods	
	
	
The	methodology	chosen	for	the	analysis	of	the	three	hypotheses	outlined	in	the	theoretical	
framework	is	a	quantitative	analysis.	The	empirical	data	extracted	combines	multi-level	data	
on	both	the	individual	and	country	tiers.	In	the	case	of	the	former,	I	drew	on	data	
encapsulated	within	the	second	release	of	the	eighth	round	of	the	European	Social	Survey,	
which	gauged	the	responses	of	over	33,000	participants	across	23	countries.	Amongst	the	
slew	of	questions	fielded	in	the	survey,	and	within	the	‘Public	Attitudes	to	Climate	Change’	
module,	I	began	by	identifying	my	dependent	variable.	With	respect	to	the	question	“Do	
you	think	that	climate	change	is	caused	by	natural	processes,	human	activity,	or	both?”,	
respondents	could	give	an	answer	ranging	from	(1)	“Entirely	caused	by	natural	processes”	to	
(5)	“Entirely	caused	by	human	processes”.	There	were	a	further	five	options	indicating	
‘Refusal’,	‘Don’t	Know’,	‘No	Answer’,	‘Not	Applicable’,	and	‘I	don’t	think	climate	change	is	
happening’	which,	like	similar	responses	in	the	individual	level	independent	variables	
chosen	(expanded	upon	below),	were	removed	from	the	analysis	so	as	to	not	sway	the	
sample	pool,	leaving	me	with	a	scale	of	1-5,	with	a	higher	score	indicating	less	of	a	degree	of	
anthropogenic	climate	change	(ACC)	scepticism.	
	
Individual	level	control	variables,	as	per	the	theoretical	framework,	centred	on	age,	
education	(number	of	years	in	education),	ideology	(scale	0-10,	left	to	right),	and	net	
household	income	(measured	in	deciles).	Health	as	determined	by	life	expectancy	was	not	
incorporated	given	the	inclusion	of	age,	nor	was	race,	given	the	blurred	ethnographic	lines	
Europe	has	would	ensure	no	conclusive	conclusions	could	be	reached.	Operationalising	the	
aggregate	level	variables	proved	to	be	slightly	more	difficult.	Given	the	ceiling	offered	by	the	
ESS,	I	looked	for	datasets	which	could	extract	information	for	all	23	countries.	The	variables	
to	be	identified	were	ones	which	sought	to	isolate	measures	of	quality	of	education,	
historical	performance	on	climate	change	issues,	perceived	capability	to	combat	climate	
change	in	the	future,	neoliberalism,	and	the	stability/strength	of	governance.	The	quality	of	
education	indicator	was	garnered	from	the	United	Nations	Human	Development	Index,	
which	consists	of	an	education	parameter	which	ranks	188	countries	on	a	scale	of	0-1	
determined	by	a	combination	of	literacy	and	enrolment	rates.	The	literacy	component	is	
weighted	at	two-thirds	while	the	enrolment	measure,	consisting	of	a	pooled	primary,	
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secondary	and	tertiary	gross	enrolment	rate,	is	weighted	at	one-third.	The	performance	
variable	was	generated	by	Germanwatch’s	Climate	Change	Performance	Index,	which	
evaluates	56	countries	(with	the	EU	as	a	whole	counted	as	an	additional	entity)	based	on	
fourteen	indicators	within	the	four	categories	of	GHG	emissions,	renewable	energy,	energy	
use	and	climate	policy.	Next,	I	utilise	the	University	of	Notre	Dame’s	Global	Adaptation	
Initiative	to	come	to	a	composite	score	regarding	the	capability	of	a	given	country	to	tackle	
future	climate	change	dilemmas.	By	factoring	a	0-1	readiness	score	and	a	0-1	vulnerability	
score,	the	university	yields	a	measure	between	0-100	called	the	ND-GAIN	Index.	
	
Our	last	two	aggregate	variables,	neoliberalism	and	stability,	function	not	only	as	control	
variables	but	as	moderators,	in	hypothesis	1(c)	and	2(b),	respectively.	The	former	is	
quantified	by	The	Index	of	Economic	Freedom,	as	measured	by	The	Heritage	Foundation	in	
consortium	with	The	Wall	Street	Journal1,	which	provides	a	score	of	0-100	based	on	
criterion	regarding	ten	factors	including	trade,	investment,	financial,	labour,	and	business	
freedom.	Finally,	the	measure	for	stability,	the	most	treacherous	of	our	indicators	and	the	
most	heavily	criticised.	Calculated	by	the	World	Bank,	the	Worldwide	Governance	Indicators	
seek	to	capture	six	key	dimensions	of	governance	in	over	200	countries:	voice	&	
accountability,	political	stability	&	lack	of	violence,	government	effectiveness,	regulatory	
quality,	rule	of	law,	and	control	of	corruption.	On	a	scale	of	0	to	5	(higher	the	better),	each	
of	these	six	measures	is	evaluated.	In	order	to	operationalise	a	working	variable,	I	have	
consolidated	the	six	values	into	a	composite	for	each	country	by	treating	each	value	as	
being	of	equal	weight;	I	must	stress	that	this	goes	beyond	the	scope	of	the	measurements	
that	the	World	Bank	has	taken	it	upon	themselves	to	do,	and	as	such	only	magnifies	the	
subjectivity	already	inherent	within	their	measurements	(which	is	well	documented).	It	was,	
however,	the	only	such	measure	found	which	could	even	remotely	measure	the	stability	or	
strength	of	the	governments	in	question.	
	
The	countries	analysed	within	the	study	are	as	follows:	Austria,	Belgium,	the	Czech	Republic,	
Estonia,	Finland,	France,	Germany,	Hungary,	Iceland,	Ireland,	Israel,	Italy,	Lithuania,	The	
																																																								
1	Note	that	the	self-professed	motivation	for	these	two	institutions	to	create	the	index,	as	per	its	
executive	summary,	was	to	promulgate	the	benefits	of	economic	freedom.	
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Netherlands,	Norway,	Poland,	Portugal,	Russia,	Slovenia,	Spain,	Sweden,	Switzerland	and	
the	United	Kingdom2.		
	
Having	established	the	variables,	it	is	the	purpose	of	this	dissertation	to	test	conclusions	to	
the	five	hypotheses	previously	laid	out.	In	the	first	(H1(a)),	we	wish	to	establish	a	link	
between	aggregate	level	neoliberalism	and	individual	level	anthropogenic	climate	change	
scepticism.	The	second	(H1(b))	contends	with	the	relationship	predicted	between	right	wing	
ideology	and	ACC	scepticism,	while	the	fourth	(H2(a))	will	examine	the	relationship	between	
government	efficacy	and	stability	and	ACC	scepticsm.	The	third	and	fifth	hypotheses	
establish	interactive	effects	which	build	on	the	results	of	the	H1(a)	&	H1(b)	for	the	former,	
and	H1(b)	and	H2(a)	for	the	latter.	One	(H1(c))	measures	the	effect	of	different	levels	of	
neoliberalism	on	the	left-right	scale’s	relationship	with	ACC	scepticism.	Similarly,	the	other	
(H2(b))	measures	the	effect	of	different	levels	of	governmental	stability	on	the	left-right	
scale’s	relationship	with	ACC	scepticism.	We	will	achieve	this	by	first	running	a	random-
intercept	multi-level	regression	model.	A	straight	quantitative	analysis	will	be	used	to	
analyse	the	validity	of	the	first,	second	and	fourth	hypotheses,	while	a	graphic	
representation	of	the	interaction	will	be	used	to	make	conclusions	on	the	third	and	fifth	
hypotheses.	Through	these	methods,	we	will	be	able	to	understand	the	relationships	held	
between	ideology,	neoliberalism,	government	stability	and	raw	psychology	as	it	pertains	to	
the	21	countries	analysed	in	Europe.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																									
2	Two	of	these	countries,	Iceland	and	Israel,	were	omitted	in	the	Stata	analysis	in	lieu	of	their	not	
being	any	data	available	for	the	Climate	Change	Performance	Index.	This	was	deemed	acceptable	as	
they	did	not	occupy	the	extremes	within	any	of	the	other	variables.	
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4.0	Empirical	Results	
	
4.1	Correlations;	
	
We	first	record	the	correlations	between	the	variables	(Table	1)3,	where	we	can	
immediately	see	that	no	issues	regarding	levels	of	correlation	between	the	control	variables	
are	too	high	for	use	come	into	play;	all	variables	are	independent	enough	of	one	another,	
absent	of	multi-collinearity	concerns.	They	are	all	also	statistically	significant4.	Regarding	
each	variables	relationship	to	climate	change	scepticism,	we	come	across	no	intuitive	
surprises.	Belief	in	anthropogenic	climate	change	is	positively	correlated	with	higher	
household	incomes	and	with	more	years	of	education.	Conversely,	it	is	negatively	correlated	
to	ideology,	left-right	scale	(where	right-wing	is	accorded	a	higher	number)	and	older	age.	
	
	
																			Table	1:	Individual	Level	Variable	Correlations	
	 (1)	
VARIABLES	 	
	 ccnthum	
	
Climate	change	skepticism	
	
	
1	
Years	of	full-time	education	completed	 0.082***	
	
Age	of	respondent,	calculated	
	
-0.118***	
	
Placement	on	left	right	scale	
	
-0.095***	
	
Household’s	total	net	income,	all	sources	
	
0.029***	
	 	
																												*	p	<	0.05,	**	p	<	0.01,	***	p	<	0.001	
	
	
	
	
																																																									
3		Statistics	summarising	the	distribution	of	the	variables	are	detailed	in	Appendix	7.1.	
	
4	Given	the	nature	of	multi-level	regression,	aggregate	level	correlations	are	only	shown	in	the	
appendices	(7.2);	it	is	of	some	interest	that	the	coefficient	between	‘Neoliberalism’	and	‘Stability’,	
our	two	control	variables,	is	quite	high	at	0.759.	Other	aggregate-aggregate	correlations	are	also	
observed	to	be	high.	
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4.2	OLS	Regressions;	
	
In	Table	2	we	see,	again	with	high	levels	of	statistical	significance,	that	within	the	individual	
level	variables,	the	following	coefficients/relationships	are	observed:	For	every	year	of	
education	completed,	a	corresponding	increase	of	0.014	units	of	climate	change	scepticism	
indicated	greater	belief	in	anthropogenic	causes.	A	similar	relationships	exist	for	the	
measure	for	household	income.	Conversely,	for	every	unit	increase	on	a	scale	of	0-10	in	
ideology,	we	see	a	0.028	unit	increase	in	belief	of	natural	causes	rather	than	human.	
Similarly,	for	every	ten	years	of	age,	a	0.043	unit	increase	in	the	same	is	seen5	6.	These	
change	effects	are	not	substantial,	and	will	have	implications	on	our	findings,	which	will	be	
discussed	below	in	detail.	
	
Table	2:	Individual	Level	Variable	Regression	
			 (1)	
VARIABLES	 Model	1	
		 		
Years	of	full-time	education	completed	 0.014***	
	
(0.001)	
Age	of	respondent,	calculated	 -0.004***	
	
(2.1*10-4)	
Placement	on	left	right	scale	 -0.028***	
	
(0.002)	
Household's	total	net	income,	all	sources	 3.8*10-4**	
	
(1.53*10-4)	
Constant	 3.792***	
	
(0.029)	
Country	Fixed	Effects	 ✓	
Observations	 36,447	
R-squared	 0.055	
	 	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
																																																									
5	While	we	see	that	the	R2	value	of	of	0.055,	which	suggests	that	the	independent	variables	account	
for	5.5%	of	variance	in	climate	change	skepticism,	is	minimal,	we	do	not	seek	to	fully	explain	the	
variance	and	beliefs	in	climate	change,	but	only	to	establish	a	relationship	between	the	control	
variables	and	climate	change	scepticism	itself.	
	
6	The	annex	contains	both	a	correlation	(7.2)	and	a	regression	(7.3)	table	for	the	‘education	lever’	
variables:	the	individual	level	‘years	of	education’	completed	and	the	aggregate	level	‘quality	of	
education’	
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4.3	Multi-level	Regression;	
	
The	results	of	the	multi-level	regression	between	the	individual	level	European	Social	Survey	
variables,	and	the	aggregate	level	country	variables,	is	as	follows	(Table	4):	
	
Table	4:	Multi-level	Regression;	
	
			 (1)	
VARIABLES	 Model	1	
		 		
Individual	Level	Variables	
	
	 	Years	of	full-time	education	completed	 0.01386***	
	
(0.00114)	
Age	of	respondent,	calculated	 -0.00434***	
	
(0.000234)	
Placement	on	left	right	scale	 -0.0257***	
	
(0.00192)	
Household's	total	net	income,	all	sources	 0.000433***	
	
(0.000159)	
	
Aggregate	Level	Variables	
	
	 	Neoliberalism	 -0.01077*	
	
(0.00608)	
Quality	of	Education	 -2.155***	
	
(0.762)	
Government	Stability	&	Efficacy	 0.251***	
	
(0.0762)	
Climate	Change	Performance	 -0.00234	
	
(0.00241)	
Readiness	for	Climate	Change	 -0.00347	
	
(0.0071)	
Constant	 5.632***7	
	
(0.485)	
	 	Observations	 33,741	
Number	of	groups	 218	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
																																																									
7	This	intercept	designation	is	effectively	meaningless,	as	no	situation	can	arise	where	all	
independent	variables	can	be	0.		
	
8	This	count	has	been	decreased	by	two	on	account	of	Israel	and	Iceland	not	having	a	data	entry	for	
the	variable	‘Climate	Change	Performance’.	
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It	is	noted	that	the	Climate	Change	Performance	and	Readiness	for	Climate	Change	
indicators	have	been	found	not	to	be	significant.	The	multivariate	equation	is	presented	
below;	
	
Climate	change	scepticism	=	0.014*eduyrs	–	0.004*agea	–	0.026*lrscale	+	4.3*10-4								
*hinctnta	-	0.011*Neolib	–	2.155*QualEdu	+	0.251								
GovStab	–	0.002*CCPerf	–	0.003*CCRead	+	5.63	
	
	
With	all	the	information	now	in	hand,	we	can	analyse	the	data	as	it	pertains	to	hypotheses	
1(a),	1(b)	and	2(a).	For	the	former,	the	relationship	between	neoliberalism	and	climate	
change	scepticism	is	found	to	be	statistically	significant.	However,	it	is	not	seen	to	be	
substantively	significant:	on	a	scale	of	0	to	100,	every	one	point	increase	in	neoliberalism	
only	decreases	the	belief	of	climate	change	as	a	human	effect	by	0.011,	on	a	scale	of	1	to	5.	
That	is	to	say,	if	a	country’s	neoliberalism	score	(keeping	in	mind	that	the	lowest	score	in	
our	sample,	Russia	at	58.2,	is	23.5	points	away	from	our	highest,	Switzerland	at	81.7)	
increases	by	ten	points,	we	will	only	see	a	swing	towards	climate	change	skepticism	of	0.1	
out	of	a	possible	4	units.		
	
Moving	to	our	hypothesis	1(b),	we	are	contending	with	the	link	between	ideology	and	
climate	change	skepticism.	The	regression	shows	that,	while	the	relationship	is	significant,	it	
is	again	not	substantive.	A	one	point	increase	in	ideology	(i.e.	towards	the	right,	on	a	scale	
of	0	to	10)	only	changes	our	dependent	variable	by	0.03	points;	it	is	extremely	minimal,	
which	conflicts	with	much	of	the	literature.	Lastly,	analysing	hypothesis	2(a),	the	
relationship	between	government	stability	&	efficacy	and	climate	change	scepticism	is	both	
statistically	and	substantively	significant.	For	every	one	point	increase	in	governance	(on	a	
scale	of	0	to	5,	with	the	lowest	and	highest	rankings	in	our	sample	again	being	Russia	at	1.77	
and	Switzerland	at	4.29)	we	see	a	full	0.25	swing	away	from	climate	change	scepticism.		
	
Overall,	then,	the	results	suggest	that	the	hypotheses	concerning	neoliberalism	and	
ideology’s	potential	relationship	with	climate	change	scepticism	are	established,	and	we	can	
reject	the	null	hypotheses.	Yet	it	is	also	found	that	the	effect	of	both	neoliberalism	and	
ideology	is	small	in	the	European	countries	sampled.	Concerning	hypothesis	2(a),	we	can	
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both	reject	the	null	hypothesis	and	determine	that	the	quantifiable	effect	of	governance	
capability	on	climate	change	skepticism	is	significant.	Looking	to	the	theoretical	framework	
in	retrospect,	we	can	see	that	the	prior	research	largely	bore	out	our	assumptions	to	be	
true,	though	it	is	seen	to	be	much	less	extreme	an	effect	in	Europe	as	it	is	in	the	United	
States,	where	much	of	the	literature	(particularly	concerning	neoliberalism	and	ideology)	
was	based.	This	is	not	surprising,	as	it	is	well	documented	how	capitalist	and	polarized	
America	is,	to	a	degree	not	generally	associated	with	Europe.	
	
	
4.4	Interactions	
	
In	order	to	interpret	the	data	for	a	successful	understanding	of	the	dynamics	at	play	our	two	
remaining	hypotheses,	we	must	employ	interaction	models	to	free	both	the	slope	and	the	
intercept	for	the	interactive	effect	of	neoliberalism	(H1(c))	/	governance	(H2(b))	on	ideology,	
before	seeing	its	resultant	effect	on	climate	change	scepticism.	For	the	former	we	plot	
neoliberalism	on	the	X-axis	against	the	marginal	effect	of	the	left-right	scale	on	climate	
change	scepticism	on	the	Y-axis,	with	the	neoliberalism	indicator	as	the	moderating	variable	
on	ideology.	For	the	latter	we	plot	governance/stability	on	the	x	axis	against	the	marginal	
effect	of	the	left-right	scale	on	climate	change	scepticism	on	the	Y-axis,	with	the	the	stability	
indicator	as	the	moderating	variable9.	The	results	are	presented	in	Figure’s	2	and	3,	
respectively,	on	the	next	page.	We	note,	too,	that	a	histogram	is	included	on	the	graph,	
which	marks	the	percentage	of	countries	falling	under	the	values	of	neoliberalism	/	
governance	(stability)	as	indicated	on	the	X-axis’.	
	
4.4.1	Neoliberalism/Ideology	
	
With	respect	to	Figure	2,	below	(in	4.4.3),	we	can	see	that	for	the	first	few	countries	on	the	
left	of	the	graph	there	is	no	significant	variation	in	the	measure,	as	the	confidence	interval	
includes	zero	up	until	a	neoliberalism	value	of	about	63.	On	the	countries	on	the	right	side	
of	the	graph	–	i.e.	with	higher	levels	of	neoliberalism	than	63	–	the	effect	on	the	left-right	
																																																								
9	The	Random	Intercept	/	Random	Slopes	Models	for	both	Neoliberalism	/	Ideology	and	Governance	
(Stability)	/	Ideology	are	affixed	in	Appendix	A4.	They	include	the	standard	deviations	of	both	the	
slope	and	the	intercept	across	countries	(the	random	effects	parameters).	
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scale	relationship	with	scepticism	decreases	as	it	progresses.	Further,	where	many	countries	
cluster,	in	the	mid-70’s	scores	for	neoliberalism,	the	confidence	interval	narrows,	suggesting	
we	can	be	more	sure	of	the	exact	variation	in	the	left-right	scale/scepticism	relationship.	
The	interactive	effect	of	neoliberalism	on	ideology	(i.e.	the	slope)	is	calculated	at	-0.002:	the	
graph	shows	that	the	effect	of	a	one-unit	increase	of	ideology	on	skepticism	is	reduced	by	-
0.002	across	values	of	neoliberalism.	This	is	an	odd	finding	given	the	findings	of	hypotheses	
1(a)	and	1(b);	the	interaction	mutes	the	effect	of	ideology	on	climate	change	scepticism	as	
neoliberalism	goes	up,	rather	than	compounding	it.	However,	it	is	noted	that	the	non-
interactive	effect	of	neoliberalism	is	0.012	in	this	model,	as	opposed	to	-0.011	in	the	
regression	model	used	in	§4.3,	which	is	the	source	of	the	unintuitive	result.10	We	conclude	
that	there	is	a	statistically	significant	but	minor	interactive	effect	of	neoliberalism	on	
ideology	as	it	pertains	to	climate	change	scepticism.	We	can	reject	the	null	hypothesis,	yet	
the	interactive	effect	mitigates	rather	than	accentuates	ideology;	it	is	in	the	opposite	
direction	from	what	was	predicted	in	H1(c).11		
	
4.4.2	Governance	(Stability)	/	Ideology	
	
With	respect	to	Figure	3,	below	(in	4.4.3),	we	can	see	that	for	the	first	three	countries	
(Russia,	Italy	and	Hungary)	on	the	left	of	the	graph	there	is	no	significant	variation	in	the	
measure,	as	the	confidence	interval	includes	zero	up	until	a	stability	value	of	about	3.05.	For	
the	remaining	countries	–	i.e.	with	higher	levels	of	stability	than	2.5	–	the	effect	on	the	left-
right	scale	relationship	with	scepticism	decreases	as	it	progresses.	Further,	where	many	
countries	cluster,	at	about	a	stability	score	of	3.3,	the	confidence	interval	narrows,	
suggesting	we	can	be	more	sure	of	the	exact	variation	in	the	left-right	scale/scepticism	
relationship.	The	interactive	effect	of	stability	on	ideology	(i.e.	the	slope)	is	calculated	at	-
0.024:	the	graph	shows	that	the	effect	of	a	one-unit	increase	of	ideology	on	skepticism	is	
reduced	by	-0.024	across	unit	values	of	stability.	This	is	consistent	with	hypotheses	H1(b)																																																									
10	The	non-interactive	co-efficient	for	ideology,	as	per	Appendix	7.4	(ii),	is	0.084,	positive	rather	than	
negative	as	per	§4.3.	This	has	no	bearing	on	H1(c),	despite	its	inconsistency.	
	
11	All	coefficients,	as	per	Appendix	7.4	(i),	are	significant,	again	with	the	exception	of	climate	change	
performance	and	readiness	for	climate	change.		
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and	H2(a):	Stability	has	a	mitigating	effect	on	ideology’s	relationship	with	climate	change	
skepticism.12	The	z-statistic,	reflecting	the	average	number	of	standard	deviations	
neoliberalism	is	away	from	its	mean,	is	-3.77.	We	infer	that	there	is	a	minor	interactive	
effect	of	neoliberalism	on	ideology	as	it	pertains	to	climate	change	scepticism,	yet	one	that	
is	statistically	significant,	and	thus	we	can	reject	the	null	hypothesis	and	confirm	the	tenets	
of	hypothesis	2(b).13	
	
4.4.3	Visualisations	
	
Figure	2:	Margins	Effects	Plot	for	Ideology/Neoliberalism	on	Climate	Change	Scepticism	
	
	
	 	
																																																								12		It	should	be	noted	that	the	non-interactive	coefficients,	as	per	Appendix	7.4	(ii),	are	0.321	for	stability,	and	0.061	for	ideology.	Again,	ideology	is	now	positive	rather	than	negative	as	it	was	in	
§4.3.	This	has	no	bearing	on	H2(b),	despite	its	inconsistency.		13	All	coefficients,	as	per	Appendix	7.4	(ii),	are	significant,	again	with	the	exception	of	climate	change	performance	and	readiness	for	climate	change.		
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Figure	3:	Margins	Effects	Plot	for	Ideology/Stability	on	Climate	Change	Scepticism	
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5.0	Discussion	
	
A	clear	story	emerges	from	these	results.	With	regards	to	neoliberalism,	we	find	that	there	
is	a	causal	relationship	whereby	more	capitalist,	free-market	societies	engender	a	public	
more	sceptical	to	the	science	of	anthropogenic	climate	change.	The	study	also	confirms	that	
the	findings	done	by	McCright	&	Dunlap	in	the	United	States	are	transferable,	namely	that	
ideology	has	a	clear	effect	on	scepticism	in	Europe,	albeit	a	more	muted	one.	Interestingly,	
however,	it	finds	that	despite	the	successful	conclusions	generated	from	the	first	two	
hypotheses	(regarding	neoliberalism	and	ideology,	as	detailed	above),	the	interactive	effect	
of	neoliberalism	on	ideology’s	effect	on	climate	change	scepticism	is	negative:	as	
neoliberalism	is	applied	in	increasing	value,	ideology	plays	less	of	a	role	in	predicting	
scepticism.	Further	research	on	this	would	be	interesting;	it	could	be	on	account	of	Europe’s	
politics	being	less	partisan,	indicating	a	lower	correlation	between	neoliberalism	and	wider	
ideology.	As	it	concerns	governance	stability	and	efficacy,	both	our	hypotheses	–	2(a)	&	2(b)	
–	have	had	their	null	rejected.	Stability	in	government	has	been	shown	to	decrease	climate	
change	scepticism,	and	its	interactive	effect	on	ideology	has	been	to	mute	the	
ideology/climate	change	relationship	further.	It	would	be	interesting	to	see	whether	a	
similar	research	model,	when	applied	to	the	United	States,	would	yield	the	same	results.	As	
alluded	to	earlier,	greater	stability,	along	with	financial	security,	could	have	the	effect	of	
psychologically	barricading	one	off	from	the	problem,	rather	than	allowing	one	the	
breathing	space	to	tackle	it.	The	ideological	partisanship	that	is	in	view	in	the	United	States	
would	make	this	delineation	between	attitudes	presumably	more	stark.	
	
The	link	between	the	hypotheses	regarding	neoliberalism	and	those	regarding	government	
stability	and	effectiveness	is	plain	to	see.	If	we	can	transition	to	a	more	regulated,	less	
capitalist	minded	society,	the	implications	will	be	severe.	Will	societies	that	are	no	longer	
achieving	the	same	financial	growth	that	neoliberalism	has	unleashed	in	the	past	four	
decades	be	responsive	to	a	shift	in	socio-economic	practice?	One	fears	that	if	they	do	not,	
the	stability	of	the	given	government,	its	robustness	and	efficacy,	will	crater	in	the	fallout.	
However,	previous	research	(Norgaard,	2011)	suggests	our	current	lifestyle	paradigm	is	not	
entirely	to	blame	for	this	impasse.	Greed	is	not	the	sole	reason	why	scepticism	abounds;	
there	are	a	number	of	psychological	factors	that	also	accentuate	our	apathy.	Fear,	guilt,	a	
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sense	of	hopelessness,	they	all	add	to	the	clamour	that	the	demographics	–	age,	education,	
race,	ideology,	etc.	–	populate,	as	well.	There	is	a	clear	link	between	ideology	and	
psychology,	the	latter	informing	the	former.	The	conclusions	of	the	last	hypothesis	suggest	
that	stable	governance	accentuates	the	effect	of	a	progressive	constituency	in	predicting	
low	levels	of	scepticism,	in	part	because	–	as	said	earlier	–	it	provides	an	economic	buffer	
and	greater	social	security	in	which	the	issue	can	be	psychologically	approached	and	solved.	
This,	however,	requires	a	left	leaning,	non-neoliberal	ideology.	Similarly,	stable	governance	
could	be	used	to	accentuate	neoliberalism	itself,	if	the	society	is	already	right-wing;	it	will	
act	to	provide	an	economic	buffer	and	greater	social	security	which	instead	will	
psychologically	blind	the	constituency.		
	
Further	studies	would	be	welcome	in	the	attempt	to	clearly	delineate	the	lines	and	
interactions	between	ideology	and	psychology	as	it	pertains	to	climate	change	scepticism;	
government	stability	is	just	one	proxy	by	which	we	can	estimate	it.	A	more	refined	
methodology	replete	with	ensuing	data	sets	quantitatively	measuring	psychological	factors	
would	be	a	boon.	At	present,	very	little	research	has	been	done	to	assess	this	with	respect	
to	pubic	opinion	on	climate	change,	and	a	wide	majority	of	this	has	been	qualitative	rather	
than	quantitative.	For	example,	the	effect	of	religion	–	in	some	cases	with	the	inherent	
belief	that	it	is	human	destiny	to	‘master’	nature	–	would	be	an	intriguing	avenue	to	go	
down.	Similarly,	the	effect	of	centrists,	who	may	be	considered	to	be	too	lukewarm	on	the	
subject	to	deploy	the	sort	of	urgency	that	the	science	of	the	issue	suggests,	and	thus	bolster	
the	overall	effect	of	the	sceptics,	would	also	be	fascinating.	Furthermore,	the	data	set	used	
for	this	dissertation,	the	8th	round	of	the	European	Social	Survey,	is	the	first	of	its	kind	to	
include	a	questionnaire	exploring	public	attitudes	to	climate	change.	A	second	survey,	or	
more,	would	be	helpful	in	understanding	the	temporal	perspective	of	climate	change	
scepticism.		
	
The	limitations	of	the	research	also	extends	to	the	sheer	gravity	of	studies	done	on	the	
United	States	at	the	exclusion	of	all	else.	Due	to	the	United	States’	brazen	examples	of	ACC	
denial,	they	have	tended	to	attract	the	lion’s	share	of	the	spotlight.	The	studies	done	on	the	
subject	regarding	Europe	have	been	narrowed	to	national	studies,	rather	than	perspectives	
on	the	bloc	as	a	whole;	the	research	done	on	the	outlook	of	the	third	world	is	even	more	
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disheartening.	Finally,	with	regards	to	the	aggregate,	country	level	data,	the	oft	criticised	
World	Governance	Indicators	used	to	compose	the	Governance/Stability	indicator	in	this	
thesis	could	also	use	refining.	Common	objections	have	been	that	they	are	arbitrary,	non-
reproducible,	composed	with	hidden	biases,	lacking	in	conceptual	clarity,	overly	complex,	
and	non-temporal.	It	is	understood	that	governance,	like	most	facets	of	politics,	is	a	highly	
subjective	proponent,	yet	independent	of	this	we	recognise	the	conclusions	generated	from	
H2(a)	and	H2(b)	will	only	go	so	far	as	the	solidity	of	the	indicators	will	allow.	
	
In	general,	the	conclusion	of	this	article	is	that	climate	change	scepticism	is	not	fully	
understood	and	requires	more	research	across	the	board.	It	has	been	found	that	
anthropogenic	climate	change	scepticism	has	fluctuated	in	the	past	thirty	years	under	the	
influence	of	number	of	different	factors,	yet	throughout	the	gap	between	the	severity	of	the	
problem	and	the	lack	of	public	salience	has	been	discernible	throughout,	all	across	the	
Western	hemisphere.	As	a	result,	no	nation	is	fully	prepared	to	either	mitigate	climate	
change’s	effects	socially,	economically	or	politically,	or	even	discuss	it	on	true	face	value.	It	
is	only	with	the	support	of	an	enlightened	and	unbiased	public	that	the	problem	can	be	
addressed.			
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7.0	Appendices	
	
7.1:	Primary	Variable	Statistics	
	
Distribution	Statistics	
	 	 	 	 	VARIABLES	 Range	 Relationship	 Mean	 SD	
	 	 	 	 	Climate	change	scepticism	 0-5	 Inverse	 3.42	 0.80	
Years	of	full	time	education	completed	 0-54	 Normal	 13.04	 3.85	
Ideology	(Left	to	Right)	 0-10	 Normal	 5.16	 2.24	
Age	 15-100	 Normal	 49.14	 18.61	
Neoliberalism	 0-100	 Normal	 71.64	 6.50	
Quality	of	education	 0-1	 Normal	 0.86	 0.04	
Stability	 0-5	 Normal	 3.61	 0.57	
Climate	change	performance	 0-100	 Normal	 53.81	 11.09	
Readiness	for	climate	change	 0-100	 Normal	 65.80	 4.52	
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7.2:	Correlations	
	
Aggregate	Level	Correlations	
		
	 (1)	 	 	 	 	
Variables	 	 	 	 	 	
	 ccnthum	 Neoliberalism	 QualEdu	 Stability	 CCPerf.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Neoliberalism	 -0.0562***	 1	 	 	 	
QualEdu	 -0.0849***	 0.755***	 1	 	 	
Stability	 0.0269***	 0.759***	 0.528***	 1	 	
CCPerformance	 0.0217***	 0.288***	 0.128***	 0.570***	 1	
ReadinesstoCC	 0.0118*	 0.528***	 0.472***	 0.772***	 0.527***	
	
*	p	<	0.05,	**	p	<	0.01,	***	p	<	0.001	
	
	
	
Education	Lever	Correlations	
		
	 (1)	
Variables	 	
	 eduyrs	
	 	
eduyrs	 1	
QualEdu	 0.174***	
	
*	p	<	0.05,	**	p	<	0.01,	***	p	<	0.001	
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7.3:	Regressions	
	
Education	Lever	Variable	Regression	
	
		 (1)	
VARIABLES	 Model	1	
		 		
Years	of	full-time	education	completed	 0.0163***	
	
(0.000876)	
Quality	of	Education	 -0.347***	
	
(0.0857)	
Constant	 3.565***	
	
(0.0730)	
	 	Observations	 42,913	
R-squared	 0.008	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
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			7.4:	Random	Intercepts	/	Random	Slopes	Models	
	
(i)	Neoliberalism	/	Ideology	
	
	
	
(1)	
VARIABLES	 Model	1	
	
		
Age	of	respondent,	calculated	 -0.004***	
	
(2.4*10-4)	
Household's	total	net	income,	all	sources	 4.2*10-4***	
	
(1.6*10-4)	
Years	of	full-time	education	completed	 0.014***	
	
(0.001)	
Placement	on	left	right	scale	 0.084*	
	
(0.046)	
Neoliberalism	 -0.012*	
	
(0.007)	
c.lrscale#c.Neoliberalism	 -0.002**	
	
(0.001)	
Quality	of	Education	 -1.625*	
	
(0.867)	
Stability	 0.281***	
	
(0.088)	
CC	Performance	 -0.002	
	
(0.003)	
Readiness	to	CC	 0.008	
	
(0.008)	
Constant	 4.375***	
	
(0.552)	
	 	Standard	deviation	-	Slope	 0.017	
Standard	deviation	-	Intercept	 0.092	
Observations	 33,741	
Number	of	groups	 21	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
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(ii)	Governance	(Stability)	/	Ideology		
	
			 (1)	
VARIABLES	 Model	1	
		 		
Age	of	respondent,	calculated	 -0.004***	
	
(2.4*10-4)	
Household's	total	net	income,	all	sources	 4.3*10-4***	
	
(1.6*10-4)	
Years	of	full-time	education	completed	 0.014***	
	
(0.001)	
Placement	on	left	right	scale	 0.061***	
	
(0.024)	
Stability	 0.321***	
	
(0.086)	
c.lrscale#c.Stability	 -0.024***	
	
(0.006)	
Quality	of	Education	 -1.666**	
	
(0.842)	
Neoliberalism	 -0.013**	
	
(0.007)	
CC	Performance	 -0.002	
	
(0.003)	
Readiness	to	CC	 0.007	
	
(0.008)	
Constant	 4.475***	
	
(0.536)	
	 	Standard	deviation	-	Slope	 0.014	
Standard	deviation	-	Intercept	 0.089	
Observations	 33,741	
Number	of	groups	 21	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
		
	
	
	
